Ever since Russell attacked him, Bergson is commonly seen as an author alien to analytical tradition and even as an irrationalist. I want to join some of the efforts to defend Bergson against such charges, this time focusing on his view of logic. While Bergson indeed seems to consider logic as more of a problem than a solution, we should understand that his remarks pertain only to a very specific notion of logic. And this notion is being overcome by the development logic underwent since Bergson´s times. Today, logic is marked by great plurality of logical systems. I argue, though, that rather than pointing to the mere multiplicity of logics, we should read this development as pointing to a more dynamic conception of logic. Instead of the popular logical pluralism, one should therefore speak of logical dynamism. With this understanding, we can reconcile both Bergson´s seemingly irationalist pronouncements about logic and his effort to carefully craft his arguments. And the dynamics of logic is best understood by means of Bergsonian philosophy. Bergson ultimately offers the analytical tradition a new understanding of logic and possibly even of rigour, a notion so dear to this tradition.

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